INTRODUCTION

Background and Significance of the Problem
It is a military axiom to "take the high ground "-and Early military applications of space-based assets bore little resemblance to their successful use in "the first information war."
1 The US developed most of its early space systems to serve the Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy. The need to protect space sources and methods resulted in a high degree of secrecy and organizational compartmentalization. As a result, when Desert Shield began the highly fragmented leadership of the space community lacked coherent doctrine, operated with an inherited top-down "technology push" for system requirements, and had little spacepower 2 experience. Spacepower was simply unprepared to support the theater Commanderin-Chief in other than the Cold War strategic 3 role.
The experiences of the Persian Gulf War confirmed these characteristics-the majority of the documented lessons concerned a lack of doctrine or a lack of space literacy/experience. In the development of spacepower, doctrine and experience have evolved much more slowly than the pace of technology. In the interim, have the US participants redressed the imbalance that existed in the development of spacepower as witnessed in Operation Desert Shield/Storm? At issue for space policy makers is the question of whether or not reforms in technology, experience, or doctrine will move the US Military Space Program toward a more robust warfighting capability.
From its meager beginnings in the Vietnam conflict, spacepower evolved dramatically. In
Vietnam the military used space-based platforms primarily for weather forecasting, navigation assistance, and communications support. During Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, US forces used the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSAT) and Leased Satellite Communications (LEASAT) Systems in a command and control role for the first time in a joint operation.
Operation El Dorado Canyon in Libya and Operation Just Cause in Panama were the first major operations in which US forces used information from space-based national intelligence systems. 4 In addition, Operation El Dorado Canyon was the first operation in which a space system developed as a Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) project was used. 5 Not until the Gulf War were US warfighters able to use the full array of civil, military, commercial, and intelligence satellites. Space-based assets carried over 80% of all messages to and from the US Central Command's (USCENTCOM's) area of responsibility (AOR). Satellite intelligence data was essential for planning the air campaign, critical for early warning of SCUD ballistic missile attacks, and aided in determining enemy positions and activities. 6 For the first time in any military campaign, Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites provided precise position information essential for navigation over an almost featureless desert terrain. Arguably, space "came of age" for warfighters in the Gulf War, but the situation was far from perfect.
US Space Command (USSPACECOM) traced some of the most significant problems from the Gulf War to a core issue-normalizing space operations for theater operators. 7 For example, since very little basic and operational doctrine existed, space preplanning for wartime 4 refine doctrine, develop tactics, formulate concepts and demonstrate systems and technologies that improve military operations and the employment of space forces in warfare. Finally, all
Service components, USSPACECOM, and intelligence organizations currently deploy space support teams to help conduct integrated space operations for the theater CINC.
In contrast to the significant reorganization of space forces, doctrinal changes were less dramatic. Operational Air Force Space Doctrine (AFDD 4) is still in coordination-it may be approved in 1995. Arguably the most important doctrinal manual, Joint Doctrine; Tactics, , was in coordination prior to the Gulf War and is still at least a year away from closure. 10 The space support teams mentioned above are available to deploy and support the warfighter, however, joint doctrine is still not available to guide their actions four years after the end of "the first information war." 11 Indeed doctrine lags, suggesting important near term focus for policy. The thesis of this study is that a lack of spacepower doctrine and experience caused the majority of the space related problems in the Gulf War. Further, while the space community has made efforts to normalize space operations since the war, the lack of doctrine and experience are still the major impediments to effective warfighting today and for future conflicts.
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) For Space Operations
Focus
This study focuses on basic and operational Air Force and Joint space doctrine which was available to the principal space participants (USCENTCOM & USSPACECOM) prior to and during the Gulf War to include operation plans (OPLAN). Equally important, this study relies largely on the unclassified portions of the after action reports from these two Unified Commands, 
Assumptions
The Gulf War validated the operational worth of space systems. Space-based communications, weather, navigation, surveillance and intelligence offered the warfighter capabilities unparalleled in earlier conflicts. The Gulf War provided a glimpse of how space control in the next century could be as imperative as air and sea control have been in this century.
In the next century, space will contribute significantly to national economic, political, and security objectives. Military, civil, and commercial space agencies have a need to develop space systems in a complementary, not competitive process. Within the DOD, cooperation is essential so that the information received from space assets continues to benefit warfighters. Outside the DOD, trust, spacepower literacy, and cooperation are critical to ensure efficient use of all space systems. The impact of spacepower for the future makes the thesis of this study all the more important.
Methodology
This study uses an inductive examination of the evidence to support the author's thesis.
The following section illustrates the USCENTCOM and USSPACECOM space lessons from the Gulf War and generalizes these experiences into three threads of development: technology, experience, and doctrine. From that perspective, a description of the efforts to solve the problems from the war is offered. Subsequent to that, observations from this study lead naturally to future implications. Finally, a problem indicating a lack of a codified, sanctioned body of propositions to guide how spacepower ought to be used is attributed to a lack of doctrine. For the purposes of this study, doctrine includes not only formal, published doctrine, but also directives, manuals, and other official published guidance. This common threads of development paradigm is not foolproof, but it does offer a simple framework for analysis and a point of departure for future investigations.
Using this three part framework, it quickly becomes obvious that the majority of the spacepower problems encountered during the Gulf War can be attributed to a lack of doctrine and experience.
Unfortunately, the development of US space technology continues to outpace both doctrine and experience. Command did not fully realize or plan for the important role spacepower would play in other than a strategic mission. By 'normalizing' space support at the theater level, USSPACECOM now envisions operating its space systems as the Air Force operates its aircraft on a day-to-day basis.
Through the documentation of these lessons, the authors not only highlighted the value of normalizing space support to the theater warfighter, they also ensured all readers would understand the significance of theater ballistic missile warning for the future. General Charles A.
Horner, who had the unique experience of being the Joint Forces Air Component Commander during the Persian Gulf War and CINC USSPACECOM after the war, declared that the number one lesson of the Gulf War was that the US must develop a ballistic missile defense system capable of directly supporting the requirements of deployed forces as well as North America. 18 Normalizing space operations mandates the development of doctrine so that forces may organize, train, and equip to prepare for future wars.
Operational control of military satellite communication systems remains fragmented.
Participants experienced the frustrations caused by a lack of centralized control of space 
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The operational control of these satellite systems remains fragmented among the various space agencies, services, and commands. This experience highlights the need for a centralized satellite communication structure in peacetime and war. 20 Maintain US multi-spectral imagery (MSI) capability. The United States must decide whether to maintain its only MSI capability, the aging Land Satellite System (LANDSAT), 21 or to continue to rely on other nations for MSI support. Multi-spectral imagery proved to be very beneficial by providing US and coalition forces the opportunity to better understand and react to changes in the battlefield terrain. It will also offer future warfighters the ability to rehearse their missions, determine optimum tactics, and identify major threat lanes or attack axes to more effectively exploit training and technology in combat. 22 Finally, if the US Commerce Department continues to control LANDSAT on a day-to-day basis, agreements must be maintained to allow for peacetime military training and wartime control. While this lesson covers all three threads of the development process, experience is the core issue.
USCENTCOM After Action Report
The war fighter's perspective was somewhat different than US Space Command's perspective. US Central Command developed 500 Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULL) after the war.
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While USSPACECOM emphasized normalizing space operations, the supported command accented the need for better doctrine, training, and support from the experts. The DSCS satellite would have improved USCENTCOM's overly-taxed communications capability significantly. The inability of the US to launch satellites in a short period of time is a serious weakness.
Gulf War Airpower Survey
The GWAPS authors focused on describing the 'space product' and its operational impact. Even though the classified spacepower research by the GWAPS personnel is much more detailed, the unclassified report used here, tells a story consistent with that of the classified reports. This unclassified report addressed five central themes.
Planning and training for the use of space systems. In the areas where space capabilities
were not fully integrated with doctrine and tactics (e.g., BDA and other intelligence functions), the importance of the five and a half months of Desert Shield preparation cannot be overemphasized. 33 While some annexes to USCENTCOM's Operation Plan 1002 were ample, weaknesses or omissions in other areas were inadequate for training or real-world events. In the cases where adequate doctrine existed, spacepower was used effectively. In cases where doctrine did not exist or was inadequate the results of space operations reflected the absence of in-depth preplanning.
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Space mobilization. The time to mobilize spacepower varied across the board. In some cases the equipment was immediately available due to peacetime requirements (e.g., F-16s equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers). In other cases the time to mobilize depended on preplanning, launch variables, and the availability of trained personnel. 35 If any one of these variables was deficient, a corresponding deficiency in mobilization was noted. War mentality of the space community oriented its support to strategic customers prior to the war (e.g., National Command Authority and various intelligence agencies). Complicating this predicament, many of the key intelligence-related assets were not controlled by the warfighting commander. 36 After Operation Desert Storm, the space community realized wars in the future will likely require theater level support from space forces. This lesson also implies that centralized control of space systems by the warfighting commander is preferred over other arrangements.
Military Utility of Space
The role of commercial space systems and receiver equipment. Commercial space systems played a significant role augmenting the military coalition forces. In addition, the coalition members cooperated to deny Iraq access to satellite imagery from France's commercial satellite por l'observation de la terre (SPOT) system. 37 Military forces not only experienced the value of using commercial satellite systems, they now better understand the value of denying the enemy's use of commercial satellite systems.
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (CPGW)
As expected, the writers of the CPGW described the lessons and observations from the war in a much broader context than the sources previously cited. 38 They were also much more interested in describing weapons and technology than operational concepts. Table 3 illustrates the space-related shortcomings and issues from Volume II, Appendix K of the report. 
The United States does not have a reactive space-launch capability.
This observation is a common theme addressed by the majority of the studies referenced for this study. US space launch, responsive or otherwise, continues to be a national problem. Efforts to resolve this issue are described in shortly.
Tactical warning capabilities must be improved. While US Space Command emphasized the lack of experience and the need for doctrine in this area, the writers of the CPGW illustrated the need for improved technology to solve the tactical ballistic missile warning problem.
Specifically, they believe that in the future, an improved sensor to replace the DSP is appropriate. 39 GPS and most satellite communications are vulnerable to exploitation. The Gulf War confirmed the need for the production, distribution, and integration of GPS receivers incorporating selective availability decryption. The Gulf War experience also proved the value of fielding the MILSTAR satellite system and installing anti-jam modems for super high frequency (SHF) fixed-base satellite terminals and tactical ground mobile terminals. 40 The aging LANDSAT system under Commerce Department Control must be replaced.
The writers of the CPGW and USSPACECOM's After Action Report agree on this issue. The Gulf War experience validated the importance of maintaining an MSI capability available for military use.
DSCS connectivity remained fragile due to age and condition of satellites and ground
stations. In the opinion of these authors, the older DSCS satellites and DSCS ground terminals require modernization. The experience from the war warrants an increase in the number of military satellites providing worldwide command and control coverage. In addition, procurement of smaller more mobile ground terminals, similar to a prototype used by the XVIII Airborne Corps, is needed to aid in transport to and within the theater. 
Status of the Lessons
US Space Command and US Central Command are the only two sources discussed with any type of formal approach to tracking the lessons of the Gulf War. However, either through omission or by design, none of the spacepower lessons from the Persian Gulf War are actively monitored by either of the unified commands today. 42 After the Gulf War, USSPACECOM initiated action on many issues attributed to the Gulf War, even though they did not actively monitor the status of any of their lessons through a formal process. While issues such as the space support teams and better OPLANs received considerable attention and each lesson was assigned a point of contact (POC), no agency was assigned the responsibility for resolving the fate of those lessons. Because of this, it is difficult to determine with confidence which experiences from the Persian Gulf War USSPACECOM considered 'lessons' for the future and which experiences were discarded after some scrutiny. Without question the USSPACECOM lessons did receive some level of hearing immediately after the war-USSPACECOM initially disseminated 97 copies of their report to 13 agencies to include all warfighting CINCs. 43 While there was wide distribution of the lessons, the point is no mechanism However, after the spacepower lessons were routed through the JULLS process, none were designated remedial action projects. 45 This does not mean the space-related lessons were not considered important, only that other processes or programs may already incorporate a solution to those problems. The lessons from USCENTCOM received much wider dissemination due to their inclusion in the JULLS database. While neither of the principal unified commands during the Gulf War currently monitors their respective lessons for resolution, USCENTCOM's lessons were adjudicated through a formal process.
Synthesis of the Lessons
In the development of spacepower, it is apparent from the studies examined that technology continues to surpass the progress of doctrine and experience. Arguably, the majority of lessons examined here were related to a lack of doctrine or a lack of experience (80%). The imbalance between space technology, doctrine, and experience is not a new phenomena, but it is commonly overlooked.
General Charles A. Horner has synthesized the most important spacepower problems from his unique perspective as the Joint Forces Air Component Commander during the war and as
Commander-in-Chief US Space Command after the war. The first major problem he noted was the lack of experience US forces had in using space assets, especially with intelligence. 46 US forces simply were not familiar with using satellite constellations like the Defense Support Program (DSP) and Global Positioning System (GPS). The second significant problem General
Horner noted was the over classification of space information. 47 The classified satellite products initially undermined the relationship between the United States and the coalition forces and was a major impediment in getting information to the warfighters. In General Horner's opinion, the way to resolve these problems is to shed the Cold War strategic heritage of space and to tear down the walls of classification the space intelligence community has built around themselves. 48 In a separate work, Mackubin Thomas Owens reviewed a number of Gulf War studies and distilled all of the lessons to three principals.
On first examination, these principles might seem so broad as to be trivial. Yet our lack of success in Vietnam demonstrates that we have not always paid as much attention to these principles as we should have. These lessons can be summarized as follows: people and organization; technology matters; and ideas (doctrine) matter. 49 Technology, experience, and doctrine do matter. In order to maximize the potential of spacepower for future conflicts, it is evident from the material presented here that the United States needs to reassess the level of effort placed in developing spacepower doctrine and experience. Unfortunately, the inclination to be on the leading edge of technology often comes with a mutually strong penchant to disregard the teachings of the past.
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The next section describes the efforts made since the war to improve these three developmental threads.
AFTER THE GULF WAR-UNEVEN IMPROVEMENT
The Air Force has a well understood, war-tested military doctrine for air power. The crux of the problem is Air Force insistence that the same doctrine applies to space.
-Kenneth A. Myers
It seems that the majority of the spacepower problems encountered during the Persian Gulf War resulted from a lack of spacepower doctrine and experience. Since the Gulf War, the development of spacepower remains uneven-doctrine and experience continue to trail behind technology. While the search for superior systems is required, until space doctrine is on an even plane with the emerging technology, the employment of spacepower will not be optimized. Space
Operation Plans have improved; however, joint space doctrine remains unpublished. For example, while various space support teams (SSTs) are training regularly with the warfighters, no joint doctrine exists to guide them on command relationships or how the space portion of next war ought to be waged. Finally, new organizations designed to educate, train, and support the warfighters are making headway to normalize space operations. The US military is making progress in all three threads of spacepower development, but at uneven rates of advance, with technology clearly in the lead-a circumstance due in part to the legacy of spacepower.
Spacepower's Legacy
The genesis of the American military space community's focus on research and Although considerable effort has gone into overcoming the research and development heritage of the United States space community, the transformation is incomplete.
What Lessons Apply to the Future?
Before examining where senior military space leadership focused development efforts after the Gulf War, it is important to determine if the pursuit of a resolution is worthwhile. Pertinent to this question is the well known analysis of World War I airpower "lessons" developed by I.B.
Holley, Jr.
These lessons are much the same as those which might have been derived equally well from the Civil War or, for that matter, from any other war. As was true of former conflicts, World War I emphasized the necessity for a conscious recognition of the need for both superior weapons and doctrines to ensure maximum exploitation of their full potential. 56 In other words, wherever military leaders fail to emphasize the need for better weapons in lieu of more weapons, they usually suffer serious disadvantage. When military leaders fail to formulate doctrine to exploit innovative weapons, they suffer further disadvantages. 57 In terms of technological development, the analysis thus far highlights the need for spacepower leadership to develop a responsive launch capability for the United States, ensure warfighters retain the ability to acquire multi-spectral imagery, and develop a new system to provide theater ballistic missile Program satellites for theater ballistic missile defense. 64 The technology acquired to secure this capability under the TALON SHIELD program responds to some of the lessons illustrated earlier.
The ALERT program is a technological attempt to normalize and improve tactical warning support to the warfighting CINCs.
The lack of a responsive space launch capability is the subject of many studies and debates, but a decision addressing a long-term resolution to the problem is at least a year away. Operation DS/DS providing US and coalition forces the opportunity to better understand and react to changes in the terrain. It also offers future warfighters the ability to rehearse their missions, determine optimum tactics, and identify major threat lanes or attack axes to more effectively exploit training and technology in combat. 70 However, the failure of LANDSAT 6 coupled with the Dod decision to stop funding for LANDSAT 7 leaves the military dependent on the aging LANDSAT 5 and foreign sources, such as the French SPOT system, to satisfy MSI imagery requirements. 71 In fact, during the Gulf War we relied exclusively on the French for MSI requirements. 72 The MSI working group has not resolved this issue but is committed to resolve the problem by the turn of the century. 78 US Space Command, the other service components, and intelligence agencies followed suit, with their version of this concept. 79 The AFSSTs will normally work with the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) to provide space support. 80 At a minimum, SSTs from each of the three service components, USSPACECOM, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) deploy to support all of the theater CINCs.
Warfighting CINCs requested support from the SSTs in 20 exercises during 1994. 81 In a more recent exercise in South Korea, more than 15 separate SSTs deployed. 82 Many agencies are now "spring-loaded" to support the warfighter, but without the aid of Joint Space Doctrine to describe the relationship between the SSTs.
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The Space Warfare Center is also conducting space courses for different levels of training.
First, the Space Tactics School completed its inaugural class in July of 1994. 84 This school (formerly the Space Tactics Instructor Course) was conceived by General Charles A. Horner to give the career space and missile officers an avenue to improve their professional knowledge. In another attempt by General Horner to pattern spacepower after airpower, the STS was designed after the USAF Weapons School. 85 Its mission is to foster inter-agency "cross-pollination" so the best techniques and experiences can be transferred among the different elements of the space community. 86 The Air Force developed another training course for the Air Force Space Support
Teams. This course is chartered to increase spacepower awareness and instruct personnel who assist the theater air component commanders and their staffs. Finally, a third spacepower training opportunity offers a 3-4 day orientation course designed for audiences with broad backgrounds, including senior leadership. 87 All of these courses are attempts to increase spacepower experience and literacy. Commission on Space, the writers of the 1992 version of AFM 1-1 were instructed to totally integrate air and space. 94 The Air Force's indecision on integration of air and space is yet another reason why space doctrine continues to flounder. As outlined, AFDD 1 will take the position that space capabilities cannot be derived by simply applying the term aerospace to what is an otherwise comprehensive "airpower" doctrine. 95 Major AF commands will have an opportunity to include applicable spacepower experiences from the Gulf War into AFDD 1. It is difficult to predict when AFDD 1 will appear, but if it follows the same pattern as its predecessor it may be years away from completion. 96 It is too soon for the authors of AFDD 1 to predict how the spacepower experiences from the Persian Gulf War will affect the new document. Bruger describes the actions needed to prepare US space forces for the "Next Space War."
Doctrine
Bruger states, "The first need is a key element-development of space doctrine to provide guidance and direction at all levels of war, across the full spectrum of conflict."
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The development of space doctrine at all levels has been and continues to be the largest impediment facing the military space community today.
CONCLUSION
. . . we need joint doctrine that clearly defines space control and force application to support the evolution of space systems from a pure supporting role into a menu of joint space force options whose stated purpose is to ensure overall US space superiority.
-Moore, Budura, and Johnson-Freese in JFQ
Summary of Findings
The overwhelming majority of the documented lessons in the Gulf War concerned either a lack of doctrine or a lack of space literacy/experience-the military space community is years away from internalizing these experiences. While the space community pursues ideas to normalize spacepower operations, doctrine is an after thought-"dull, boring, and useless," or "important but not read by warriors." 108 Force Doctrine (AFDD 1). Finally, the US military space community is dangerously close to completely discarding forward thinking in space doctrine. We must reverse this mindset to ensure doctrine guides the development and employment of future space systems.
Experience. The development of space doctrine and the liberation of the space community from the security restrictions of the Cold War paradigm will spur education concerning the attributes of spacepower. All Services will benefit from the development of space doctrine because it can serve as the basis for spacepower professional military education (PME).
An aggressive spacepower PME program, from basic training to the senior service schools is the only way to fully internalize spacepower lessons. In addition, a major step forward in educating the force and to establish core competency would tear down the walls of classification the military space intelligence community has built around themselves. The United States will be better served by establishing a single military space sector with representation from all the services. The current ultra secret intelligence space sector is very resilient 111 but inefficient. In short, the United
States should "give the warfighting CINCs more control over intelligence support." 2 In AFM 1-1, spacepower is defined as "That portion of aerospace power that exploits the space environment for the enhancement of terrestrial forces and for the projection of combat power to, in, and from space to influence terrestrial conflict." This definition originated in a draft to AFM 2-25 which no longer exists. Another definition is found in the current draft of AFDD 4, "Spacepower is the capability to exploit civil, commercial, intelligence, and national security space systems and associated infrastructure to support national security strategy and national objectives from peacetime through combat operations." This study will use the AFDD 4 definition. 3 Many of the reports analyzed for this thesis use the words strategic and tactical to differentiate between missions to support the nuclear deterrence strategy of the United States and other than nuclear missions respectively. Strategic and tactical are more appropriately used in terms of levels of war or effects during war. For a useful definition, see Colonel John A. Warden, The Air Campaign (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989): 2-3.
